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THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
Tokyo’s Nuclear Option
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Will Japan go nuclear? Doubtful—but what if it does? It is possible to envi-sion circumstances that would impel Tokyo and the Japanese populace
to cast aside their long-standing dread of nuclear weapons and to construct an
arsenal of their own for the sake of national survival. Menacing strategic sur-
roundings or a collapse of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty are two such circum-
stances. If some nightmare scenario did come to pass, the common wisdom has
it, Japan could build a working bomb in short order. In 1991, Richard Halloran
averred that “Japan is N minus six months,” although he saw no evidence that Ja-
pan entertained any ambition to tap its latent weapons capability.1 In 2007, Gary
Sick, a well known commentator on Middle East affairs, reported having been
privately told that Japan “could do it, sort of, over a long weekend.”2 Japan, that
is, may now qualify as a “threshold state,” a term “commonly understood to
mean possession of the indigenous ability to acquire nuclear weapons within a
relatively short time frame, ranging from a few hours to several months.”3
Japan inhabits a tough neighborhood, while the U.S. military position in Asia
looks increasingly wobbly. Nearby North Korea con-
ducted a nuclear test in 2006 and paid no penalty for
defying the “six party” framework. In January 2009, in
fact, Pyongyang announced it has assumed an “all-out
confrontational posture” toward rival South Korea
and has “weaponized” enough plutonium for four or
five implosion-type nuclear warheads.4 Japanese
thinkers have studied the rise of China closely and
what it portends for Japan, positioned just off the
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Asian seaboard. Beijing has mounted an aggressive naval buildup over the past
decade, gaining confidence in its capacity to subdue Taiwan militarily if need be
while holding U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier task forces at bay. Taiwan adjoins Japan’s
southern strategic frontier, meaning that Tokyo could not look with equanimity
on a cross-strait war or a return of the island to mainland rule. Indeed, Japanese
imperialist expansion more than a century ago was designed precisely to secure
its southern strategic flank, the back door to its Ryukyu island chain, which
stretches to the coast of Taiwan.5 Since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Taiwan
has been in “friendly hands” for over a century. Accordingly, Japanese policy
makers do not take lightly a forcible Chinese acquisition of Taiwan.
To complicate matters, as Chinese strategists look to the “day after Taiwan”
they are considering how to exert influence on the sea lines of communication
connecting Chinese ports with vital resources in the Middle East and Africa.
China’s turn toward the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean may give Beijing
not only more control over its own maritime security but also more control over
the maritime communications on which the resource-dependent Japanese
economy relies.
Seen in realist terms, then, China’s maritime rise threatens to degrade Japan’s
strategic position in the region. Tokyo may ultimately conclude that self-help
represents the only way to shore up its position. Skyrocketing costs of develop-
ing and procuring weaponry are driving the force structure of the American
military inexorably downward in numbers. Just one example: the Pentagon’s es-
timates of future U.S. Navy fleet size now run as low as 150 ships, a fraction of the
nearly six-hundred-ship navy of the 1980s.6 Even the 313-ship fleet espoused by
the Navy leadership now appears fanciful, with 283 ships currently in active ser-
vice and little prospect of accelerating shipbuilding rates enough to increase the
inventory by thirty vessels.7 Allies like Japan monitor such trends closely. A pre-
cipitous decline in conventional U.S. military capacity in the theater could have
major diplomatic ramifications, undercutting American staying power in the
western Pacific, giving rise to Japanese fears of abandonment, and unsettling the
entire Asian security architecture. More to the point, Tokyo would likely inter-
pret such a decline as foreshadowing an end to the American nuclear guarantee.
Accordingly, an effort to discern, as through a glass darkly, Tokyo’s nuclear
options and their likely consequences is not only worthwhile but imperative for
analysts and practitioners of Asian affairs. First, we briefly consider the motives
that would induce Japan’s leadership to make such a radical break with the
antinuclear sentiments of the postwar era. Second, we consider the prospect of
Japanese “nuclear hedging,” an approach under which Tokyo would build up a
capacity to develop nuclear weapons, keeping its strategic options open while
remaining in formal compliance with its commitments under the Nuclear
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Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Third, we consider the technical feasibility of
a swift Japanese nuclear breakout, paying particular attention to assumptions
that Tokyo could stage a breakout within a year of deciding to do so.8 Fourth, we
identify possible force structures and strategies available to Japan should the is-
land nation’s leadership indeed decide it is in the national interest to cross the
nuclear-weapons threshold. We close by identifying areas for future research,
with the aim of generating a literature of immediate use to policy makers in
Washington and Tokyo.
WHY GO NUCLEAR?
Debate has swirled around prospective Japanese nuclear aspirations at least
since 1958, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi told the Diet that the nation’s
postwar “peace constitution” did not forbid a strictly defensive nuclear arsenal.
Successive governments, however, disclaimed the words of the hawkish Kishi. By
1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was spelling out “Three Non-Nuclear Princi-
ples,” informing lawmakers that his government would not manufacture, pos-
sess, or “allow the introduction of ” nuclear arms into Japan. Sato’s principles
earned him the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize and have remained the gold standard for
Japanese nonproliferation policy ever since. However, it is noteworthy that even
Sato was acutely aware of Japan’s vulnerability in the dangerous Cold War secu-
rity environment. Following China’s nuclear breakout in October 1964, Sato
quickly sought reassurances from the United States that Washington would ex-
tend its nuclear umbrella to Japan.9 In a conversation with Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara during a state visit to the United States, Sato declared,
“Should a war break out [between Japan and China], we expect the United States
to immediately launch a retaliatory nuclear strike [against China].”10 Presum-
ably, America’s extended deterrence was a critical precondition to Sato’s
willingness to forgo the nuclear option.
In any event, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” persists to the present day. Matake
Kamiya explains Tokyo’s self-imposed injunction against bomb making in terms
of the general pacifism codified in Japan’s peace constitution, lingering memo-
ries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and antimilitary senti-
ments dating from the interwar years.11 As a result, concludes Kamiya,
opposition to nuclear weapons “is deeply embedded in postwar Japanese culture
and society. . . . [I]t is still far stronger, even today, than those who warn of im-
pending Japanese nuclear armament realize.”12 The vast majority of observers in
Japan and in the West are inclined to agree with Kamiya, if for different reasons.
Indeed, very few scholars have lent credence to rationales for a nuclear
buildup.13
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Tetsuya Endo, a former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of
Japan, argues that while Japan possesses the technical capabilities to stage a nu-
clear breakout, the material costs combined with the prospects of international
isolation would deter Tokyo from pursuing such an option.14 Brad Glosserman
cautions that Japan likely would not survive intact as a nation-state following a
nuclear exchange—even a limited one—owing to its lack of strategic depth and
the extremely high population density throughout the Japanese Archipelago.15
Llewelyn Hughes identifies a series of domestic institutional constraints, rang-
ing from constitutional to informal, that have anchored Tokyo securely to the
U.S. nuclear guarantee.16 Others believe that Japan is actively pursuing other
strategic options, including strengthening its own conventional military capa-
bilities and deepening its alliance ties to the United States, as substitutes for an
independent nuclear deterrent.17 In sum, normative, material, geographic,
institutional, and strategic considerations militate against going nuclear.
There is no denying these constraints. Yet the logic of national security—of
threat and response—is not so readily dismissed, even under the special circum-
stances prevailing in postwar Japan. The prevailing skepticism, moreover, has
precluded serious discourse on practical and critical steps—including the devel-
opment of nuclear doctrine, command and control, and force structure—that
Tokyo would have to implement should it embark on a breakout. Therefore, it is
useful to postulate strategic rationales and chart a road map for Japanese
nuclearization.
Scott Sagan outlines three hypotheses to explain why nation-states seek nu-
clear weapons. First, according to Sagan’s “security” model, governments “build
nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially
nuclear threats.” George Shultz memorably summed up the security approach:
“Proliferation begets proliferation.”18 Two policies are possible when threats
arise, says Sagan. Sounding a Thucydidean note, he maintains that “strong states
do what they can . . . adopting the costly, but self-sufficient, policy of developing
their own nuclear weapons.” Weak states, by contrast, “do what they must: they
can join a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear
retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence.”19 Doubts about the
credibility of a nuclear ally’s security guarantee presumably bring pressure on
even weak states—or on states that, like Japan, rely on alliances for other
reasons—to seek nuclear capability. This is the logic of self-help.
Second, Sagan’s “domestic politics” model “envisions nuclear weapons as po-
litical tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.”
Three protagonists in nuclear policy making are typically the nuclear energy es-
tablishment, the armed forces, and politicians. The former two actors may have
bureaucratic interests in going nuclear, as it would give them leverage in
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budgetary processes, allowing them to attract resources. “When such actors
form coalitions that are strong enough to control the government’s
decisionmaking process . . . nuclear weapons programs are likely to thrive.” Con-
versely, when a coalition opposes nuclear weapons or the various actors find
themselves at loggerheads on this question, more ambiguous results are likely.20
A clash among domestic interests seldom yields neat, entirely rational policies.
Finally, under Sagan’s “norms” model, “nuclear weapons decisions are made
because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an
important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity.” Government
decisions are driven “not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national security
interests or parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and
shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international
relations.” A nuclear arsenal is a token of modernity, legitimacy, and great-power
status. As Sagan points out, an interactive relationship exists between norms and
the bureaucratic actors of his second model. As norms mature over time, they
tend to be written into bureaucratic procedures and practices, influencing calcu-
lations vis-à-vis important matters like whether to seek nuclear capability.21 Be-
liefs and convictions color rational cost-benefit analyses.
In the Japanese case, it appears, one of Sagan’s models is in tension with the
other two. Rational security calculations point to a growing threat, an ally in rel-
ative decline, and thus a weaker position for Japan in Asia. Those who incline to
this way of thinking tend to see a nuclear breakout as potentially unavoidable.
But foreign policy, observe Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, represents “the
extension of politics to other realms.”22 They liken foreign policy to a collage, an
amalgam of bargains struck, compromises reached, and coalitions formed on a
variety of issues—often under pressure.23 Proponents of Japanese nuclear-
ization will inevitably encounter deep-seated resistance, both from the elector-
ate and from bureaucratic institutions in which antinuclear attitudes are
entrenched.
Discord is the product of this societal indecision. Applying Allison and
Zelikow’s metaphor in the context of Sagan’s three models, Japanese policy
makers will incline strongly to some middle way between pro- and antinuclear
factions. If successful, they will maximize their liberty of action, appease im-
portant parties with stakes in the outcome, reinforce American support for the
security alliance, and avoid setting off a public outcry.
OPTION ONE: NUCLEAR HEDGING
If we have interpreted events correctly, Tokyo will hedge its bets on whether to
go nuclear—if indeed it has not already embarked on such an approach.24 Ja-
pan’s leadership, that is, will postpone a decision for as long as possible,
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monitoring its security surroundings while quietly building up the planning
and strategy-making processes, expertise, infrastructure, and materiel that
would make possible the fielding of a modest arsenal within a reasonable
amount of time. This is not an uncommon approach for governments. Notes
Ariel Levite, “Would-be proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the
bomb or for that matter to give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before
they are on the verge of attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then.”
Having a “nuclear ‘option’” often makes sense in pure realpolitik terms.25
Evelyn Goh defines hedging in general terms as “taking action to ensure against
undesirable outcomes, usually by betting on multiple alternative positions.” This
makes sense, says Goh, when the leadership cannot decide on “more straightfor-
ward alternatives,” rating the costs of such alternatives as too high or the payoffs
too low.26 More to the point, Levite defines “‘nuclear hedging’ as a national strat-
egy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback.”27 John F. Kennedy fa-
mously predicted that fifteen to twenty nuclear-weapon states would emerge by
the end of the 1960s.28 That clearly did not happen. It nevertheless appears that
hedging offers the middle way that embattled Japanese makers of policy and strat-
egy will be looking for as they try to satisfy the interests that Scott Sagan identifies.
In this scenario, much of the hedging will take place within the domestic arena.
Moving beyond mere calls for debate on the nuclear question, the Japanese policy
community would begin a more serious discourse on breaking out. For example,
the prime minster could openly and formally revisit and reaffirm the constitu-
tionality of nuclear armament, perhaps by appointing a blue-ribbon commission
of some type. Such a move would be as much about shaping public opinion and
expectations as about developing concrete plans to be implemented.
A gradual, transparent, and deliberate analytical process thus would aim to
move the nuclear issue inside the bounds of routine political discourse for the
Japanese state and society. Llewelyn Hughes astutely observes that recent insti-
tutional reforms have centralized power in the prime minister’s office, bolster-
ing that body’s ability to set and impose Japan’s national security agenda. This
and other reforms, Hughes concludes, have “ensured that the formal barriers to
nuclearization are surmountable.”29 It is therefore conceivable that future efforts
to strengthen executive authority further would signal the will and expected ca-
pability to overturn constraints on pursuing an independent nuclear option.
Persuasive rhetoric toward important audiences will be critical to any hedg-
ing strategy. Japanese leaders will need to navigate among the domestic interests
examined by Scott Sagan, reassure the watchdog International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the international community that Japan has no desire to
break its NPT commitments, and concurrently apply pressure on the United
States not to draw down its conventional military commitment to Japan or,
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worse still, fold up the nuclear umbrella under which Japan shelters. Indeed,
added pressure on Washington to make its processes for making nuclear strategy
and decisions more transparent to Tokyo would implicitly signal that Japan’s
nonnuclear posture is not absolute.
In other words, if the United States fails to integrate Japan more meaning-
fully into its nuclear plans, Tokyo might have no choice but to pursue an inde-
pendent option. Alternatively, Tokyo might modify its Three Non-Nuclear
Principles, lifting its self-imposed ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons
onto Japanese territory. This would represent a precursor to limited deploy-
ments of U.S. nuclear weapons to strengthen deterrence.30 The deployment of
Pershing intermediate-range missiles in Europe during the 1980s offers a use-
ful precedent. Such a move might eventually open the way for joint manage-
ment of nuclear weapons positioned in the home islands, similar to existing
U.S.-NATO arrangements.31 A strategy of calculated ambiguity that at once
played up Japanese capacity to go nuclear and remained noncommittal on Jap-
anese intentions of doing so would offer Tokyo its best diplomatic option
should security conditions continue to decay in East Asia.
OPTION TWO: BLACK SWANS AND NUCLEAR BREAKOUT
What would it take to empower adherents of Sagan’s security model, allowing
their views to win out over domestic interests opposed to nuclear weapons and
over norms of decades’ standing? A central feature of Japan’s security strategy is
the nation’s utter dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. As Yukio
Satoh succinctly explains, “The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence will continue
to be Japan’s only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear
and other strategic threats.”32 That is, even barely perceptible signs of weakness
in the U.S. nuclear posture (either perceived or real) could trigger alarm and
overreactions in Japan.
Japanese concerns over the Obama administration’s recent moves to advance
nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such sensitivities. Specif-
ically, Japanese policy makers fret that “extended deterrence could weaken if
Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these [global dis-
armament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a
latent North Korean nuclear capability in exchange for safeguards against prolif-
eration.”33 In 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test compelled the Japanese govern-
ment to seek public reassurances from the United States that extended
deterrence remained intact.34 Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter of
Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could
fundamentally reshape the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Re-
search Service forcefully contends that “perhaps the single most important
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factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S.
guarantee to protect Japan’s security.”35 The causes and processes by which U.S.
extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo’s eyes are beyond the scope
of this article. Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the
nuclear umbrella would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese
nuclear breakout.
Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the
proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference
to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of
weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to
break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear
heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Pen-
insula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were
not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons,” despite the presence of
tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park
Chung Hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters,
President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nu-
clear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an
independent deterrent.
Similarly, China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be
wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent de-
struction.”37 This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled
Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rap-
prochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist
leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under
the Shanghai Communiqué, which began the normalization process, the United
States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the
Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting them-
selves,” including nuclear weapons.38 Recently declassified materials document
growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island
throughout the decade.39
In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances,
persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese
and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to prolifer-
ation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, height-
ened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States.
While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these
two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the
possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.
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As noted above, analysts and Japanese politicians evince conviction that Japan
could erect a nuclear deterrent in a relatively short period of time. We are unper-
suaded by this apparent optimism and conventional wisdom. It is true that Japan
possesses all the trappings of a nuclear power. Yet the path to a credible nuclear
status is likely to be long and winding. Above all, Japan needs the material capacity
to develop a bomb.40 With fifty-five nuclear-power plants in operation around the
country and the nuclear sector’s large reserves of reactor-grade plutonium, Japan
enjoys a readily available supply of fissile material. According to Sankei Shimbun,
Japan possesses enough plutonium on its own soil and in reprocessing plants
overseas to produce 740 bombs.41 How usable this reactor-grade material would
be for weapons purposes, however, remains a matter of dispute among technical
specialists. An internal government report unearthed by Sankei Shimbun report-
edly concluded that Japan would need several hundred engineers, 200–300 billion
yen (or $2–$3 billion), and three to five years to fabricate a serviceable nuclear
warhead.42
The real question would be timing. It is doubtful in the extreme that Japan
could circumvent its safeguards agreement with the IAEA undetected for
long.43 While the cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that it is possible
to bypass the IAEA, Japan holds itself to much higher, more stringent stan-
dards, having assented to one of the most intrusive, regular inspection pro-
grams in the world.44 Furthermore, think of the diplomatic blowback: one can
only imagine the uproar if such an effort on the part of Japan, a consistent, sin-
cere opponent of nuclear weapons, were exposed to public and international
scrutiny.
Thus, Japanese policy makers must consider the extent to which Tokyo
could withstand mounting external pressure to cease and desist while its nu-
clear complex amassed enough bomb-making material for a viable arsenal. To-
kyo cannot expect to deceive the international community long enough to
present the world a fait accompli. It would probably have to make its intentions
clear—and endure international opprobrium—well before reaching the
breakout threshold, if not at the outset.
Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an
arsenal, its engineers would still have to leap over several technical barriers.
First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct
route would be to arm Japan’s existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear
bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force (SDF) inventory,
however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes
while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no
strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en
route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated
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integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is
surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the
Asian mainland.
In light of this, ballistic or cruise missiles would likely rank as Japan’s weapon
of choice.45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile
delivery system, it would have to produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear war-
head that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a
feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant
lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the
U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field,
takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert
some of its civilian space-launch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would
have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for
long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself—unless it could
purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf from the United States, a doubt-
ful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the politi-
cal sensitivity of such a sale—compelled to start from scratch. Procuring and
integrating satellite guidance, terrain-contour matching, and other specialized
techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese
weapon scientists.
There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety
and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual
nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the
credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too
small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted there safely—even
leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given the memories of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near
some Japanese-held island in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again,
the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) would be intense, while the Japanese populace would think back to the
Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need only re-
call the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBT’s entry
into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal
but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan.
The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bomb-making
efforts.
The technical dilemmas reviewed above demonstrate that there is no shortcut
to a nuclear breakout, even for a technological powerhouse of Japan’s standing.
The Congressional Research Service notes, “If one assumes that Japan would
want weapons with high reliability and accuracy, then more time would need to
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be devoted to their development unless a weapon or information was supplied
by an outside source.”47 Kan Ito, a commentator on Japanese strategic affairs for
nearly two decades, concurs, considering observers who predict a rapid break-
out “utterly presumptuous.” Declares Ito, “It is dangerous to believe such a mis-
conception. It will take 15 years for Japan to build up its own autonomous
nuclear deterrence capability that is truly functional.”48 While one may quibble
with his fifteen-year timeline, which seems unduly pessimistic, the period re-
quired to develop and field a credible deterrent would probably be measured in
years rather than the weeks or months cavalierly bandied about.
STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE
Beyond technical and tactical decisions associated with breaking out, Japan
would need to develop comprehensive policies and processes to harness its nu-
clear arsenal. As noted above, strategic ambiguity over Japanese intentions and
capabilities is probably impossible. As a nation that has long cherished its demo-
cratic institutions and unquestioned civilian control of the military, Tokyo
would need to issue formal public statements and official documents regarding
Japanese nuclear doctrine. Intended for public and international consumption,
such declarations would presumably predate the SDF’s deployment of a deter-
rent force, helping reassure Japan’s neighbors, friends, and allies, especially the
United States.
Japanese officials would probably frame their doctrine strictly in terms of Ja-
pan’s unique strategic position and local circumstances. Geostrategic realities
would dictate that Japan renounce the war-fighting utility of nuclear weapons,
hold fast to an unconditional no-first-use policy, and adopt an exclusively retal-
iatory nuclear posture. Japan is simply too small and vulnerable to contemplate
any but the most minimal deterrent options. The goal of Japanese nuclear strat-
egy would be to threaten credibly limited nuclear strikes against one or several
countervalue targets, deterring first use by an adversary. Such a punitive ap-
proach has long underwritten the doctrines of such smaller nuclear powers as
France and China.
None other than former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has expressed
confidence that a defensive, minimalist nuclear posture would suffice for Japan.
With candor rare among Japanese politicians, he states:
I believe it is constitutional for Japan to possess small-size nuclear weapons as long as
we use them only for the purposes of defending our country. A small-size nuclear
weapon has a strength that is less than one-third of the power of the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima. Even the U.S. Congress allows research on such small-size
nuclear weapons. In order to raise Japan’s defense capability in case of emergency,
our Constitution should allow Japan to possess small-size nuclear weapons.49
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While Nakasone does not stipulate the size he prefers for Japan’s nuclear arse-
nal, he clearly believes that the destructive power of low-yield weapons would
generate sufficient deterrent effects vis-à-vis would-be enemies. Keishi Saeki of
Kyoto University articulates a similar logic for an independent Japanese
deterrent:
Possession of retaliatory nuclear arms consists of a means to retaliate against nuclear
attacks by other nations. In other words, we must resign ourselves to accepting the
initial nuclear attack. And, such conditions should alleviate to a certain degree threats
against other Asian nations. Moreover, the option of retaliatory nuclear arms re-
quires preventive preemptory strikes against imminent potential (very highly proba-
ble) nuclear attacks from other nations. Accordingly, aside from possession of
nuclear arms, probably necessary will be the procurement of precision guided weap-
ons and a missile defense system, and intelligence-gathering activities.50
Saeki provides a useful framework for matching means to his proposed retal-
iatory option. Other Japanese analysts have also offered surprisingly concrete
proposals for a credible, defensively oriented deterrent. A former member of the
Ground Self-Defense Force, Nisohachi Hyodo, argued as early as 1996 for an un-
dersea deterrent, persuasively and methodically discounting the utility of land-
and air-launched delivery systems, as well as of systems deployed in the surface
fleet.51 Fixed silos would be most vulnerable to preemptive strikes, he argues,
while Japan is too small to make maximum use of rail- or road-mobile launch-
ers. Aircraft could be destroyed on the airfields in a first strike, while surface
combatants could be tracked and sunk with little warning by nuclear attack sub-
marines. As such, Japan’s only option is to deploy conventionally powered sub-
marines armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs. For
Hyodo, two submarines, each carrying only one missile and “roaming in
separate sea zones,” would be adequate to deter one target country.
In contrast, a former deputy minister under the Koizumi administration,
Kenzo Yoneda, is less quick to dismiss the possibility of fitting surface warships
with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Yoneda postulates that land-attack cruise
missiles with a range of a thousand kilometers—akin to the American Toma-
hawk but with shorter range—deployed on board the Maritime Self-Defense
Force’s Aegis destroyers would constitute an important component of Japan’s
nuclear posture.52 While Yoneda furnishes no specific estimates of how many
missiles it would take to constitute a credible seaborne deterrent, his emphasis
on cruise missiles, which carry far smaller payloads than intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, dovetails with Nakasone’s call for “small-size nuclear weapons.” The
relatively short ranges Yoneda envisions, moreover, imply a modest regional
deterrent force for Japan.
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Kan Ito argues that Japan must possess two or three hundred nuclear-armed
cruise missiles deployed on “small destroyers and submarines” to establish min-
imum deterrence.53 Ito presumably supports using existing platforms like Aegis
destroyers and the latest diesel submarines as launch platforms. He also makes a
compelling case against ballistic missiles, contending that they are far more
destabilizing than cruise missiles because of sharp differences in speed and de-
structive potential. Relatively slow, single-warhead, low-yield cruise missiles
would signal Japan’s determination to blunt opponents’ preemptive strategies
while remaining in an unmistakably retaliatory posture. This approach, Ito con-
cludes, would be more conducive than a ballistic-missile force to a stable Asian
military balance.54 Clearly, then, even hard-liners and proponents of nuclear-
ization embrace a defensive-minded nuclear doctrine.
The aforementioned options are not mutually exclusive. Japan could very
well adopt a mix of delivery systems, or the SDF could phase in more sophisti-
cated weaponry and platforms as they become available. It is therefore worth ex-
ploring the risks, rewards, and technical feasibility of some of the proposals
reviewed above. First, Japan would be hard pressed to choose SLBMs as the
backbone of its deterrent. The Maritime SDF’s existing conventional subma-
rines are too small to carry such missiles. While a fleet ballistic-missile subma-
rine, or SSBN, would represent the ideal platform for a guaranteed second-strike
capability, the technological hurdles would severely challenge even Japan’s
top-notch scientific and engineering community. To name just one such hurdle,
the SDF possesses no naval reactors. Developing and building the propulsion
plant for an SSBN would be enormous undertakings in themselves. The finan-
cial cost of building, maintaining, and deploying multiple SSBNs—the Mari-
time SDF would need two to three boats to keep one on patrol at any given
time—would tax a defense budget already under strain. Tetsuo Sawada of the
Tokyo Institute of Technology estimates that a single SSBN armed with ballistic
missiles would cost Japan a breathtaking five billion dollars, while a credible de-
terrent force involving several submarines would reach an astronomical ten
trillion yen, or in excess of $100 billion.55
We therefore judge an undersea ballistic-missile deterrent improbable for Ja-
pan unless the security outlook is truly dire, justifying an effort of such magnitude
and duration. Cruise missiles, in comparison, are cheap and easy to develop. In-
deed, much of the technology is readily available off the shelf in the marketplace.
Since Japan would aim retaliatory strikes at large cities, its cruise missiles would
not need to be particularly accurate. Major Asian metropolises like Pyongyang,
Beijing, and Shanghai are near the coast, making penetrating enemy airspace rela-
tively easy. The target set would fall well within the range of missiles like those es-
poused by Kenzo Yoneda. In theory, only one bird would need to get through for
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Japan’s minimum deterrent to be credible. Ito’s call for two to three hundred mis-
siles thus may be somewhat excessive, even assuming high attrition rates due to
malfunction or enemy interception.
In all probability, Japanese cruise missiles, which are far smaller than medium-
range ballistic missiles, would be fired from conventional submarines—presumably
from torpedo tubes, given how difficult it would be to retrofit these boats with verti-
cal launchers—to maximize the survivability of the deterrent force. We forecast that
Tokyo would need time to perfect techniques and procedures for launching cruise
missiles from submerged conventional submarines. In the meantime, once the mis-
siles became available in sufficient quantities, they could be deployed in vertical-
launch canisters on board Aegis destroyers as a stopgap measure. Two or three de-
stroyers could cruise simultaneously in disparate locations in the Pacific, enhancing
redundancy and survivability. Cruise missiles could also be fired from fighter air-
craft at long distances. For instance, missiles launched from an F-2 based in Oki-
nawa would be able to reach most of China’s major coastal economic centers. Such
redundancy at sea and in the air might meet Japan’s strategic requirements tempo-
rarily until the undersea option was fully functional.
We acknowledge the drawbacks to deploying cruise missiles aboard conven-
tional submarines. They are slow by comparison to their nuclear-powered
brethren, their range is limited by fuel capacity, and they can remain on patrol
for only a short period. SDF conventional submarines thus would likely find
themselves confined to patrol grounds near Japanese coasts, rendering them
vulnerable to detection. Even so, air-independent propulsion will offset the de-
tection problem once installed in Japanese boats, allowing them to remain un-
derwater for longer stretches. The availability, number, and modest cost of these
proven vessels far outweigh their technical shortfalls.
Keeping two boats on station at all times would likely meet Japan’s deterrent
needs. SDF boats would presumably operate from the existing submarine bases
at Kure and Yokosuka. This would allow easy access to patrol grounds in the Sea
of Japan and along the Asian seaboard south of the Japanese home islands. Kure
in particular makes for an ideal base, offering a central location in the Inland
Sea, ready egress into both the Pacific and the Sea of Japan, and easily defensible
approaches. Coastal metropolises would be within reach of Japanese boats on
station, especially once technical improvements increased SDF cruise missiles’
range to rival that of the TLAM-N. The Maritime SDF could diversify its portfo-
lio, as it were, operating in different zones to threaten different targets and com-
plicate adversaries’ antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problems. Tokyo could surge
additional submarines at any given time, moreover, straining the ASW capabili-
ties of prospective adversaries. Up to eight boats could conceivably be sent to
sea, according to the back-of-the-envelope calculations provided below. In light
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of the Chinese navy’s inattention to ASW, this “limited” nuclear capability
represents a potent one indeed.
Finally, there is the matter of budgeting and force sizing. With over forty de-
stroyers and nearly twenty submarines, Japan doubtless already boasts one of
the largest and most advanced navies in the world. Nevertheless, undersea deter-
rent patrols would likely demand substantial, though not prohibitive, increases
in the size of the submarine fleet. We assume that the Maritime SDF would de-
ploy a separate submarine group dedicated exclusively to nuclear strike, while
maintaining adequate numbers for traditional operations, such as sea-lane se-
curity and sea denial. Such a decision would remove the nuclear-armed boats
from potentially risky frontline duties along the Asian littoral environment, per-
mitting crew members to accumulate hard-earned experience and sharpen the
specialized skills needed for deterrent patrols in the Pacific.
How would Tokyo finance a new arm of its submarine force? In order to
maintain its qualitative edge in undersea warfare, the Maritime SDF has tradi-
tionally decommissioned submarines unusually early, introducing more ad-
vanced boats to replace older ones. To support the nuclear mission, accordingly,
the maritime service could easily extend the service life of its fleet by at least ten
years, allowing for the conversion of existing boats and the introduction of new
submarines without undermining Japan’s overall undersea prowess. The U.S.
Navy’s conversion of four Ohio-class SSBNs to serve as cruise-missile platforms,
or SSGNs, offers a precedent for this sort of effort.
What about numbers? We believe a deterrent force of twelve cruise-missile
submarines would let the SDF keep two boats on patrol at all times. How do we
arrive at this figure? While Japanese mariners understandably divulge few de-
tails about the technical specifications of SDF submarines, we estimate—very
conservatively—that their fuel capacity would permit Japanese diesel boats to
remain on patrol for one month. (As a crude measuring stick, the endurance
for the ubiquitous, German-built Type 209 is advertised at fifty days at the out-
side.)56 If so, approximately six boats would be necessary for the SDF to keep
one on station. Consider:
• One boat would be deployed at any given time, with three others undergo-
ing routine upkeep, crew training, and local operations between deterrent
cruises. This would permit a four-boat rotation, with each vessel making
three patrols annually. This is a leisurely operating tempo by U.S. Navy
standards and thus sustainable indefinitely for the SDF.
• Using the U.S. Navy rule of thumb that it takes three units to keep one in
full readiness for deployment, we further assume that an additional two
boats would be in extended overhaul at any time, subtracted from the
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rotation. This leaves us with our six-to-one ratio between boats in the Mar-
itime SDF inventory and those actually at sea. Again, this may overstate
matters, as the American thumb rule assumes six-month deployments,
with all the wear and tear that extended cruises impose. Japanese units face
fewer demands, and so the SDF could well get by with less.
Multiplying by two—again, with one squadron presumably based at Kure and
another at Yokusuka—yields a total of twelve boats. Should Japan’s strategic po-
sition continue to deteriorate, Japanese strategists may conclude a bigger mar-
gin of deterrence—and thus a bigger undersea fleet—is necessary to national
defense.57 If so, additional six-boat increments could lie in store. But the more
modest fleet sketched here, we believe, would provide more than ample retalia-
tory capacity for “minimal deterrence with Japanese characteristics.”
Such a fleet would be affordable despite the real and nettlesome budgetary
constraints Tokyo confronts. Modest increases in the defense budget as a per-
centage of gross domestic product (GDP) would generate sufficient resources
(in absolute terms) to pay for such a buildup. If the Japanese government came
to see the security environment as menacing enough to warrant a nuclear break-
out, it would likely reprogram funds to support a naval buildup to support nu-
clear deterrence. Tokyo has long fixed its defense expenditures at about 1 percent
of GDP, amounting to over forty billion dollars a year. The Japanese government
would certainly have to shatter this self-imposed, somewhat arbitrary ceiling. If
Tokyo were to increase the defense budget by 20 percent—that is, to 1.2 percent
of GDP—the additional eight billion dollars per annum could furnish the finan-
cial foundation for a major modernization and expansion of the submarine
fleet. The average cost of a single conventional submarine on the world market
(anywhere between $200 and $400 million per boat) suggests that Japan pos-
sesses the financial clout to meet these new force-structure requirements.
UNTHINKABLE BUT VALUABLE ANALYSIS
In closing, it is worth reemphasizing that this study eschews any assessment of
the likelihood of Japan’s going nuclear. Ample work already exists on the pros
and cons of nuclearization. As noted in the introduction to this essay, we concur
in general that it is highly unlikely that Tokyo will pursue an independent nu-
clear arsenal for the foreseeable future. The U.S.-Japanese alliance is arguably in
the best shape ever, while mainstream Japanese policy makers remain confident
in the credibility of American extended deterrence. However, we believe that this
largely valid consensus on the improbability of a nuclear breakout has precluded
constructive discourse on practical American policy alternatives should Tokyo
undertake a radical change of course. While it may be distasteful to contemplate
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such a scenario, we are convinced that there is genuine analytical utility in think-
ing about the unthinkable. Chief among our findings through this mental exer-
cise is that Japan will not “break out” in the literal sense of the term. Rather, it
will proliferate in slow motion, if it makes a decision to go nuclear.
This study by no means constitutes an exhaustive exploration of Japan’s nu-
clear options and their possible consequences. Four main areas of research
would be worth pursuing further. First, a comparative analysis of historical
models—particularly the British and French experiences during the Cold
War—might offer fruitful insights and potential models for Japan to emulate.
Findings regarding the extent to which these smaller nuclear arsenals comple-
mented or fit within the broader U.S. nuclear strategy would be particularly
useful for Japanese policy makers.
A second and closely related point is that this study has focused exclusively on
a potential Japanese nuclearization process. It would be useful to make an effort
to foresee the plausible range of impacts such a momentous decision could have
on the U.S.-Japanese alliance on the “day after” a breakout. We incline to doubt
that the security partnership would collapse overnight, especially if Tokyo initi-
ated open, constructive consultations ahead of time. Even so, the transpacific al-
liance would never be the same. Would Washington withdraw its nuclear
umbrella in a fit of pique? Or would Tokyo and Washington transcend the initial
discord, integrating their nuclear strategies and developing a transpacific deter-
rent, much as the U.S.-British alliance formulated a transatlantic deterrent to
Soviet aggression?
Third, a Japanese nuclear breakout would certainly release shock waves
across Asian capitals. How would Japan’s retaliatory posture and forces inter-
act with the Chinese nuclear doctrine and North Korea’s nuclear program?
Would Tokyo’s entry into the nuclear club spur both horizontal and vertical
proliferation?
Fourth, but certainly not least, there are technical questions to resolve. As
noted before, the timing of any Japanese effort to breach the nuclear threshold
would depend on large part on the availability of weapons-usable fissile mate-
rial. How easily could Japanese nuclear engineers put the nation’s stockpile of
reactor-grade plutonium to use for manufacturing nuclear warheads? It seems
reasonable to suppose that Tokyo could convert this material for use in nuclear
payloads over time; the main question is when.
These are questions eminently worth pondering. We make no pretense of of-
fering the last word on the subject of Japanese nuclear options. We hope it is a
useful first word in a sorely needed discussion of naval strategy and deterrence
in Asia.
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